This essay appears in the Stanford University Journal of Science, Technology, & Society –  Vol. 9, No. 3 .

With the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s (JAXA) announcement of its first moon shot in 2018, this study examines the geopolitical context of the moon shot and how it connects to Japan’s national competitive strategies against its neighbors. After discussing the current space competition in Asia and the security challenges that Japan confronts in the post-Cold War era, the study surveys how the region is characterized by a lack of cooperation in space due to unresolved historical issues, which, in turn, has led to a redundancy among space programs. It then considers how Japan has adapted the foreign dimension of its space policy to this environment and how the nation can create opportunities for greater regional cooperation in space. The study concludes that Japan (with support from the U.S.) can create new forms of multilateralism via transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs), which would serve as stepping stones for Asian nations to ensure that access to space remains safe and secure.

On April 19, 2015, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) announced its plan to attempt Japan’s first lunar landing by fiscal 2018. Funding is contingent upon approval by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT)—the authoritative body that holds primary responsibility for JAXA’s finances and personnel (Anan, 2013, p. 1). If approved, JAXA will use its Epsilon solid-fuel rocket technology to launch and deploy a SLIM (or Smart Lander for Investigating Moon) probe onto the celestial surface (McKirdy, 2015). Officials indicated that the purpose of the mission would be to collect data and develop technology to conduct soft landings, both of which could be later used for a manned mission to Mars (End, 2015). However, while the unmanned moon mission would enhance Japan’s international prestige in space and technology, their efforts are redundant to the achievements and objectives of other nations in Asia and thus evidence a lack of regional cooperation in space. Moreover, while JAXA’s moon mission is scientific in its purpose, its geopolitical context connects to Japan’s competitive national strategy against neighboring threats from North Korea and China (Kallender-Umezu, 2015). This paper discusses 1) the context of the current space competition in Asia, 2) the challenges Japan faces in the post-Cold War era, which have led the nation to alter its space strategy, 3) the redundancy in space programs and lack of cooperation in space that characterizes the Asia region, 4) the foreign policy dimension of Japan’s space policy, and 5) prospects for regional confidence-building measures.

I. The Current Space Competition in Asia

James Clay Moltz (2012), a professor in the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s Department of National Security Affairs, notes that Japan’s overall motivations for space activity are indicative of the Asian space rivalry (or second space age) taking place, where Asian nations compete for regional recognition in space technology and achievements. The second space age began in October 2003 when China became only the third country in the world, after the U.S. and Russia, to demonstrate its human spaceflight capabilities with the return landing of Shenzhou 5 (Moltz, 2012, p. 12). By comparison, though, China is a new entrant as a space power, and its rapid and impressive progress in space technology has largely been based on the pioneering achievements of the U.S. and Russia. In his report to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Kevin Pollpeter (2015) emphasizes that while China is probably truthful in expressing that it is not in a space race, such statements cloud the true objective of its space program—“to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, economically as competitive as the U.S. is in space” (Pollpeter p. iii).

At the same time, unlike the bipolar dynamics of the space race during the Cold War era, the current competition is multipolar due to the economic globalization of information, investments, and ready availability of space technology in the international market (Moltz, 2012, p. 14, 22). Setsuko Aoki (2009), a professor at Keio University and former associate professor at the National Defense Academy of Japan, highlights that antagonistic dyads (India-China, China-Japan, India-Japan, India-Pakistan, Japan-South Korea, and North Korea-South Korea) characterize the space contest in Asia (p. 369). Yet the rivalry is less of a quest for world leadership than it is competition for regional ascendancy, technological prowess, economic advantage, and power (Moltz, 2012, p. 32). In turn, the pursuit for dominance in these areas has influenced and led to national space programs that are siloed from neighboring nations. While the high risks and costs of space should encourage collaboration, the current realities of the regional dynamics have limited space cooperation.

I would like to thank Dr. James Clay Moltz of the Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Scott Pace of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University, Dr. Irmgard Marboe of the University of Vienna and former chair of the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Ms. Crystal Pryor of the University of Washington, Takeshi Hakamada of Google Lunar X Japan, and Keisuke Shimizu of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) for their insightful feedback and advice.